



















Abstract: This paper provides a formal model of the trial selection process that 
incorporates the Priest-Klein hypothesis and alternative theories of selection.  We derive 
the conditions under which the hypothesis is valid, and examine implications for the 
relationship between trial outcome uncertainty and litigation.  The model suggests a 
generalization of the hypothesis. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In The Common Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes noted that 
 
[l]egal, like natural divisions, however clear their general outline, will be 
found on exact scrutiny to end in a penumbra or debatable land.  This is 
the region of the jury, and only cases falling on this doubtful border are 
likely to be carried far in court.
1 
 
In spite of this early recognition by a prominent legal theorist, the connection between 
legal uncertainty and litigation was not examined within a theoretical framework until 
Priest and Klein (1984).  Since then, a substantial literature has developed on the 
selection of disputes for litigation. 
  Trial selection theory consists of models that explain or predict the characteristics 
that distinguish cases that are litigated to judgment from those that settle, and the 
implications of those characteristics for important trial outcome parameters, such as the 
plaintiff win rate, and for the development of legal doctrine.
2  The starting point for this 
literature is the Priest-Klein hypothesis, which holds that the plaintiff win rate will tend 
toward fifty percent unless the litigants have asymmetric stakes.
3 
  Although the Priest-Klein hypothesis is widely cited in the law and economics 
literature and has been tested empirically, it still lacks a formal treatment.
4  The original 
Priest-Klein article provides an informal argument, as do later articles testing it.
5  The 
lack of a formal model makes it difficult to separate important from unimportant 
assumptions in the Priest-Klein analysis, and to formally separate Priest-Klein analysis 
from competing theories of trial selection.  Moreover, the interpretation of tests of trial 
                                                 
1 Holmes (1881), at 127. 
2 On trial selection and the development of legal doctrine, see Priest (1980), Gennaioli and Shliefer (2007), 
Miceli (2009). 
3 On the theory of stakes asymmetry and litigation, see Che and Yi (1993). 
4 Waldfogel, 1995, comes closest to providing a formal treatment of the Priest-Klein analysis.  However, 
the fifty percent prediction of the analysis is demonstrated in the Waldfogel article through the use of a 
simulation rather than a formal proof. 
5 Of the articles testing the Priest-Klein hypothesis or related claims, see Waldfogel, (1995), Waldfogel 
(1998), Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999), Siegelman and Donohue (1995), Eisenberg (1990), Eisenberg 
and Heise (2007).   2
selection theories is also dependent on understanding the formal scope and limitations of 
the underlying models.
6 
   This paper offers a formal model of trial selection in the manner of Priest and 
Klein.  The model incorporates alternative (e.g., asymmetric-information) theories of 
selection as well.  Given that the empirical and theoretical literature on trial selection has 
been described as a horse race between Priest-Klein (symmetric information) and 
asymmetric information theories of trial selection,
7 the model in this paper effectively 
unifies the major trial selection theories under one framework.
8   
  The model permits an examination within a single framework of the results in the 
trial selection literature.  For example, the fifty percent prediction of the Priest-Klein 
analysis is based on a hypothetical distribution of the probability of litigation mapped 
over an index of the defendant’s probability of violating the legal standard (i.e., the guilt 
level).  The fifty percent prediction holds in the limit, it has been said, as the trial rate 
approaches zero – which may happen because uncertainty over trial outcomes diminishes 
or because trial becomes more expensive.
9  While this is helpful to the fifty percent 
prediction in the symmetric information model, it is not a necessary feature. 
  This model shows that the implications of trial selection theory depend almost 
entirely on the “censoring function” – i.e., the function describing the probability of 
litigation conditional on the defendant’s guilt level – and the probability distribution of 
guilt.  When both are symmetric the fifty percent prediction holds precisely – and there is 
no need to talk about limiting conditions.  When the guilt distribution is not symmetric 
we derive a general condition for it (“window property”) that supports the tendency 
toward fifty percent.  The fifty percent prediction is also generated in the limit as the 
censoring function becomes more convex, which occurs as trial outcome uncertainty 
                                                 
6 For a discussion of this issue, see our companion piece to this paper, Hylton and Lin (2009). 
7 Waldfogel, 1998, at 451. 
8 However, as noted in the Hylton and Lin (2009) review, trial selection theories can be based on a larger 
set of variables than examined in the symmetric and asymmetric information literature.  Eisenberg and 
Farber (1996) develop a theory of selection based on the cost of litigation. 
9 Waldfogel, 1995, at 232-33.  Waldfogel’s 1995 article, which is perhaps the most elaborate formalization 
to date of the Priest-Klein model, describes the key Priest-Klein prediction as follows: “The limiting 
implication of their model is that, with equal stakes to the parties, as the fraction of cases going to trial 
approaches zero (either because plaintiff or defendant uncertainty about trial outcomes declines or because 
trial costs increase), plaintiff win rates at trial will approach 50 percent.”  Waldfogel, at 229-30.   3
declines at the endpoints of the guilt spectrum relative to the middle – i.e., in Holmes’s 
terms, umbral uncertainty declines relative to penumbral uncertainty. 
  There is a simple generalization of the Priest-Klein hypothesis in terms of this 
framework.  When the censoring function is skewed right (because trial outcome 
uncertainty is greater at high levels of guilt than at low levels) the expected win rate will 
tend toward a level greater than fifty percent; and, conversely, when the function is 
skewed left, the win rate will tend toward less than fifty percent. Symmetry of the 
censoring function is a necessary condition for the fifty percent result. 
  The model also permits us to consider the extent to which informational 
asymmetry leads to departures from the symmetric information analysis.  When the 
symmetry condition holds for the censoring function, informational asymmetry generates 
intuitively sensible predictions: e.g., when defendants only are informed, the win rate is 
less than fifty percent because guilty-and-informed defendants settle disproportionately.  
However, when the symmetry condition does not hold, then it is no longer clear that 
informational asymmetry will result in win rates greater or less than fifty percent, 
consistent with Shavell (1996). 
  Our approach, which consists of relaxing symmetry conditions for the censoring 
and distribution functions, can be contrasted with much of the asymmetric information 
modeling of trial selection, which is based on models of strategic behavior in settlement.  
However, the implications of the strategic behavior models are highly dependent on their 
particular assumptions.
10  We avoid dependence on specific strategic behavior 
assumptions.  This model shows that a rich analysis of trial selection theory can be based 





11 as initially presented in Priest and Klein (1984), builds on 
the idea, recognized at least since Holmes, that only the most uncertain disputes go all the 
                                                 
10 Compare, for example, the divergent implications of Bebchuk (1984) and Png (1987), which both present 
strategic behavior models of the settlement process. 
11 We are distinguishing “trial selection theory” from “settlement theory”.  Trial selection theory generates 
predictions on important trial outcome parameters, such as the plaintiff win rate.  The more general   4
way to a judgment in litigation without being settled beforehand.  According to the 
Priest-Klein analysis, if litigants have symmetric stakes the win rate for plaintiffs will 
tend toward fifty percent, like coin tosses.  The model assumes litigants have symmetric 
information and does not explicitly incorporate strategic behavior. 
If litigants have asymmetric stakes, the Priest-Klein conjecture holds that the 
plaintiff win rate may exceed or fall below fifty percent.
12  One of the parties may have a 
strong desire to litigate in order to persuade or induce the court to change the law or to 
establish a reputation as a litigator.  Priest and Klein introduced empirical evidence to 
support their hypothesis.  Eisenberg (1990) reexamined the empirical evidence and found 
significant deviations from the fifty percent hypothesis.  Waldfogel (1995), in contrast, 
finds evidence consistent with the Priest-Klein hypothesis; specifically, that plaintiff win 
rates tend toward fifty percent as the trial rate approaches zero.  This finding suggests that 
the fifty percent win rate is more likely to be observed as legal uncertainty declines, or as 
trial costs increase. 
  The trial selection literature has been expanded by the incorporation of strategic 
behavior and asymmetric information.  The first formal model of trial selection under 
informational asymmetry was offered in Shavell (1996).
13  Building on the screening 
model of Bebchuk (1984), Shavell concluded that any win rate percentage could be 
observed, and that there was no clear tendency for the plaintiff win rate to be less than or 
greater than fifty percent in the context of informational asymmetry.  Hylton (2002), 
building on the signaling model of Png (1983, 1987), argues that win rates will tend to be 
consistent with the Priest-Klein analysis, and to show predictable deviations from fifty 
percent when information is asymmetric. 
  Although the asymmetric information models have provided a rigorous 
framework for trial selection theory, in contrast to the informal analysis of Priest and 
Klein, they have failed to generate a consistent set of testable predictions with respect to 
                                                                                                                                                 
settlement literature examines settlement incentives.  On the settlement literature, see Bebchuk (1984), 
Daughety and Reinganum (1993), Spier (1992).   
12 For an early critique of the Priest-Klein model, see Wittman (1985).  Wittman found that in a more 
general model there was no tendency toward a fifty percent win rate. 
13 Froeb (1993) presents a model of case selection under asymmetric information that precedes that of 
Shavell.  However, Froeb focuses on the criminal law setting rather than the civil law setting of the Priest-
Klein analysis.   Hylton (1993) presents an informal analysis of trial selection in the civil context under 
informational asymmetry.   5
trial outcome parameters.  The asymmetric information models have to be assessed 
within the context of their particular assumptions. 
  This paper offers an alternative strategy to modeling trial selection theory that 
captures both Priest-Klein and asymmetric information models.
14  We pinpoint the 
distributional assumptions that are needed for the Priest-Klein conjecture to hold, as well 






The core component of this model is the familiar Landes-Posner-Gould (LPG) 
litigation condition: parties choose to litigate rather than settle a dispute if and only if 
 
(Pp – Pd) > γ                  (1) 
 
where  Pp = plaintiff’s estimate of the probability of a verdict in his favor, Pd = 
defendant’s estimate of the probability of a verdict in plaintiff’s favor; γ = C/J, where C = 
the sum of the plaintiff’s litigation cost (Cp) and the defendant’s litigation cost (Cd), and J 
= the value of the judgment.  I assume that the settlement cost is zero (i.e., the bargaining 
costs to reach settlement are zero).  If the litigation condition (1) holds, the set of 
mutually beneficial settlement agreements is empty, so the parties choose to litigate. 
Each party’s predictions is the sum of a rational estimate and an error term: Pp = 
P
'
p + εp, Pd = P
'
d + εd.  If Ωp represents the information set of the plaintiff, and Ωd the 
information set of the defendant, P
'
p  = E(Pp| Ωp) , P
'
d  = E(Pd| Ωd), E(εp | Ωp) = 0, E(εd | 
Ωd) = 0. 
                                                 
14 These models use the litigants’ predictions as the basis of a model settlement and trial selection.  
However, a trial selection theory can be based on any factor that determines the decision to litigate rather 
than settle.  Eisenberg and Farber (1996) introduce the litigious-plaintiff hypothesis, which holds that win 
rates can be understood according to the plaintiff’s cost of litigation, which varies more for individuals than 
for corporations.  In this paper we will restrict ourselves to the Priest-Klein and asymmetric information 
models.  Those models deliver the clearest implications for trial outcome parameters.   6
The error terms result from lapses or random shocks in the prediction process.  
The litigant has all of the information that he would use to reach a prediction of the 
probability of plaintiff victory, and then something happens that disturbs the true 
prediction from the rational estimate based on his information set.  One can draw an 
analogy to a production process that experiences a glitch in one of every one thousand 
runs of the process, resulting in an altered product.  The production glitch could be due to 
a random mechanical failure or to an external shock, such as a lighting strike.  In the 
same sense, a litigant’s prediction is based on a set of informational inputs and a 
cognitive process for converting those inputs into a prediction.  But the conversion 
process is not error-free.  A litigant can have a lapse that leads to an error in prediction; 
or the information needed to make the prediction may exceed the litigant’s cognitive 
capacity at the moment.  Alternatively, a random shock – an unforeseen intervention – 
can disturb the actual prediction from the rational estimate. 
  Suppose, for example, that both plaintiff and defendant have access to the same 
information bearing on the defendant’s guilt.  Both observed the manner in which the 
defendant, a medical doctor, conducted a test.  A rational observer, examining the same 
information, would predict that the probability that the doctor would be held liable for 
malpractice is .6.  However, the plaintiff may fail to take all of the facts favoring the 
defendant into account, or mistakenly believe some fact improves his likelihood of 
success when it does not, and predict that probability he will win is .65. 
  This sort of fact-based error should be distinguished from judicial error.  The 
rational observer might predict a .6 likelihood of victory on the basis of the law, but the 
probability of judicial error could lead such an observer to predict a higher likelihood of 
victory.  For example, a rational observer may believe that the plaintiff will be 
particularly appealing to a jury because of some unfortunate event in his life (e.g., job 
loss).  Even though the law, as applied to the facts, would lead the rational observer to put 
the probability of plaintiff victory at .6, the possibility of judicial error, in the sense of 
deviating from the law, might lead the observer to set the probability of victory higher. 
Rational predictions regarding the trial outcome will incorporate judicial error 
probabilities.  Let v = probability of a verdict for the plaintiff, w = probability of guilt 
(equivalently, the probability that the defendant in a legal dispute violated the legal   7
standard), q1 = probability that a defendant who has violated the legal standard will be 
found innocent (type-1 judicial error), and q2 = probability that a defendant who has not 
violated the legal standard will be found guilty (type-2 judicial error).  Assuming w, q1, 
and q2 are public information, the rational estimate (or the objective probability) of a 
verdict in the plaintiff’s favor, given public information, is ν = w(1–q1) + (1–w)q2.  So 
that courts are at least minimally accurate, we assume 1–q1 > q2. 
  We will focus on two information scenarios below.  One is the scenario in which 
each litigant forms a rational estimate based solely on public information of the 
likelihood of a verdict for the plaintiff (P
'
p  =  P
'
d).  This is a case of symmetric 
information, with litigation driven by prediction errors.  The other scenario is that of 
asymmetric information, in which the defendant knows whether or not he complied with 
the legal standard. 
  Another important assumption of this model is heteroscedasticity of the prediction 
error variances.  From the perspective of a litigant, the outcome of a dispute is most 
uncertain when the rational component of the litigants’ prediction is equal to fifty 
percent.  This is the case in which the trial outcome is viewed by the litigant as a coin 
toss.  We will therefore assume that the variance of the prediction error term is a function 
of the rational component of the litigant’s prediction, and that the variance reaches a 
maximum when the rational component is fifty percent and with minima at the endpoints. 
 
Symmetric Heteroscedasticity: () ( 1 ) vv σ σσ = =− and, for 0 < v < ½, () 0 v σ′ > . 
 
B. The Probability of a Verdict for the Plaintiff, the Probability of Guilt, and the 
Frequency of Litigation 
 
The probability of a verdict for the plaintiff (v) can be viewed as an index of case 
quality.  If the distribution of v is uniform, then the probability of a verdict for the 
plaintiff is the same in all disputes; or equivalently, all claims have the same quality.  If 
the v distribution is skewed right, then there is a tendency for legal disputes to involve 
guilty defendants.  We will assume that v is governed by the probability density function   8
h(v).  Since v is a linear function of the probability of guilt, the probability density 
function for v will be related to the density for the probability of guilt w. 
  To simplify, we will start with the assumption that courts are error free, so that the 
probability of a verdict for the plaintiff is the same as the probability of guilt (v = w).  
Thus, h(v) describes both the distribution of guilt and the distribution of the probability of 
a plaintiff verdict. 
  If all disputes were litigated to a judgment, the average plaintiff win rate would be 
determined by the distribution of guilt (or case quality) in the population.  Thus, if all 
disputes were litigated the expected plaintiff win rate would be the same as the expected 





) ( ) ( dv v vh v E μ                  (2) 
 
Of course, not all cases are litigated.  And the cases that are litigated are not necessarily a 
random sample from the population of disputes.  For this reason it is necessary to 
consider the factors that influence litigation. 
  The probability of litigation conditional on the guilt level is f = prob((Pp–Pd) > γ) 




d.  We assume that 
the error difference εp – εd is generated by a truncated normal distribution with mean zero 
and variance σ






d – 2ρ. 
Given these assumptions, the probability of litigation conditional on the guilt level 
can be expressed as  
 
f = 1 – G,                  (3) 
 
where G, the probability of settlement conditional on the guilt level, is  
   9

















.           (4) 
 
  There are some immediate implications from this setup.  As the degree of 
uncertainty regarding the probability of liability (σ) increases, the probability of litigation 
rises, a basic result of the Priest-Klein model.  The frequency of litigation function f 
combines features from several models of litigation.  As the cost of litigation rises 
relative to the judgment (γ increases) the probability of litigation falls (Landes-Posner-
Gould).  Over-optimism generates litigation.  A negative correlation between prediction 
errors (ρ), consistent with litigant over-optimism (Shavell, 1982), reduces σ which in turn 
increases litigation. 
 
C. Symmetric Information Model: Preliminary Results 
 
The symmetric information case (Δ = 0) has been associated with the Priest-Klein 
analysis, according to which litigation is driven by uncertainty and the plaintiff win rate 
tends toward fifty percent (assuming symmetric stakes).  In this part, we will examine the 
basic components of that analysis. 
The Priest-Klein conjecture is based on what should be observed within the 
sample of cases that have been litigated – i.e., the ex post plaintiff win rate.  Within the 
sample of litigated cases, according to the conjecture, one will observe a plaintiff win rate 
that tends toward fifty percent, irrespective of the underlying distribution of guilt.  We 
will focus on a formal construction of this argument. 
Given the assumption of no judicial error, the expected plaintiff win rate is equal 
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 .                             (5) 
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For simplicity, we will refer to this measure as the plaintiff win rate.  An alternative way 
of measuring the plaintiff success would focus on the expected plaintiff win rate within 
the set of litigated and settled disputes: .  However, the selection literature 
has focused on the plaintiff win rate within litigated disputes, and this is a sensible 
decision given the great difficulty in finding reliable statistics on settled disputes (Priest 
and Klein, 1984). 
1
0
()() v fvhvd v ∫
The following proposition is implied by (5): 
 
Proposition 1: The expected population level of guilt is equal to the sum of the 
plaintiff win rate, multiplied by the trial rate, and the expected level of guilt within settled 
cases, multiplied by the settlement rate. 
 
Proof: This follows from a straightforward decomposition for the expected 
population win rate: 
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■      (6) 
 
Proposition 1 clarifies the relationship between the quality of claims and the 
frequencies of trial and settlement under the symmetric information model.  Assume, for 
example, that the Priest-Klein conjecture holds, so that the plaintiff win rate is fifty 
percent.  If, in addition, the expected guilt level in the population is .75 and the trial rate 
is .25, the expected guilt level within the sample of settled cases would be .83. 
  Proposition 1 also clarifies how little information is conveyed by the observed 
plaintiff win rate, and how much information must be obtained to fully understand the 
distribution of case quality within the samples of settled and litigated disputes.  Knowing 
the plaintiff win rate tells us little about the average quality of all disputes.  However, 
knowing the plaintiff win rate, the rate at which cases settle, and the average probability   11
of prevailing within the sample of settled disputes would allow us to infer the average 
quality of all claims. 
  It should be clear that the Priest-Klein conjecture depends on there being a 
“pyramid of disputes” (Felstiner, et al. 1980) with trial occurring within a fraction of 
disputes at the top.  The conjecture holds that the plaintiff win rate is invariant to the 
underlying distribution of guilt (or case quality).  This claim becomes more plausible as 
the trial rate diminishes. 




()() 1 ()() f vhvd v Gvhvd v θ ≡= − ∫∫ .                          (7)       
 













% .                    
Then the expected guilt level decomposition (6) can be written as: 
 
ˆ (1 ) μ θμ θ μ =+ −%                      (8)  
 
With basic terms defined, we will focus on constructing the Priest-Klein argument 
within this model.  The first result, which is an important component of the symmetric 
information analysis, shows the relationship between the frequency of litigation and the 
guilt level. 
 
Proposition 2:  The probability of litigation conditional on the guilt level,  f, 
reaches its maximum when the guilt level (the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff) is 
equal to fifty percent. 
   12
Proof: We need to show that the f is symmetric around ½ and it is strictly 
increasing for 0 ≤ v ≤ ½.  Combining these two properties, the proof is done. 
Step 1: Symmetry property:   
By definition, (( ) )1 (( ) ) f vG v σ σ =− . Because () ( 1 ) vv σ σ = − , we have 
() 1 ( () )
1( ( 1 ) )











Step 2: Monotonically increasing property:  
First, we will show that the frequency of settlement, G(σ), is strictly decreasing in 
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The above equation can be considered as the difference of two points along the curve of 





will depend on the shape of 0 (; ) x λ ε . We need to check 
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because is decreasing in 
R l
σ and it reaches zero while σ goes to infinity.   
Based on the above arguments, we can conclude that  0 (; ) x λ ε is first decreasing and then 
increasing inγ .   
Now we show that  0
1
(; ) (; 0
2
) x x λε λε
σσ
== =, which means that γ has the same value 
evaluated at its left-end point and right-end point.  
To sum up,  0 (; ) x λ ε is first decreasing and then increasing in γ , and λ has the 
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The final step of the argument is to show what the foregoing implies for the 
frequency of litigation function.  For any 01 / v ≤ ≤ , we have 
() ( 1 () ) () ( ) ()
0




∂∂ − ∂ ∂ ∂
== − = −
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> .■  
 
Although the frequency of litigation conditional on the guilt level is symmetric 
about ½ and has a maximum at that point, the conditional probability of litigation 




() 1 () 1 f vd v Gvd v =− < ∫∫ .  Since f is not a density over v, the better description of 
the Proposition 2 is that f is stochastically dominant when v = ½. 
The next step in formalizing the Priest-Klein conjecture is to identify the set of 
special cases in which the fifty percent claim holds with precision. 
 
Proposition 3: The plaintiff win rate is equal to fifty percent for any symmetric 
distribution of guilt. 
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The first equality is by integration by substitution; the second is by the symmetry 
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Proposition 3 is a stronger result than the Priest-Klein conjecture.  The Priest-
Klein conjecture predicts a tendency of the plaintiff win rate toward fifty percent, no 
matter what form the underlying distribution of case quality takes.  The reason is that 
cases of high and low quality are censored out of the final litigation sample by the 
settlement process.  Our third proposition shows that the censoring process yields a 
precise fifty percent outcome in the case of a symmetric distribution of case quality.  
Moreover, there is no need for the trial rate to be small (as argued in Waldfogel, 1995) in   15
order to get the fifty percent prediction – the prediction is invariant to the trial rate in the 
case of symmetry. 
The symmetric case quality distribution includes the normal (truncated) and 
uniform as special cases.
15  The result is not surprising, given that the average guilt level 
in the symmetric distribution case is fifty percent.  We have only shown that when the 
guilt distribution is symmetric, the plaintiff win rate is not biased away from the 
population average guilt level as a result of the settlement process.  Since the conditional 
probability of litigation given guilt level does not itself form a probability density over 
the guilt level, it is not immediately obvious that the settlement-censoring process should 
preserve the population average even in the symmetric guilt distribution case. 
If the underlying distribution of case quality is not symmetrical, the plaintiff win 
rate is not necessarily fifty percent.  The question then becomes under what conditions 
the censoring process causes the win rate to tend toward fifty percent.  
In the more general setting, the Priest-Klein conjecture has two components, or 
implications.  One is that the plaintiff win rate will be closer to fifty percent than is the 
expected population guilt level.  The second is that as the censoring process becomes 
more severe, in the sense that the conditional litigation function f becomes more convex, 
the tendency of the plaintiff win rate toward ½ will become more pronounced or reliable.  
One might think of the first component as a weak requirement, but it is not.  As we show 
below, the first implication is not more likely to be satisfied than is the second.  We will 
take up the two implications in order. 
First, we consider whether the plaintiff win rate will tend to be closer to fifty 
percent than is the expected population guilt level.  In other words, if all disputes were 
litigated to a final judgment, the plaintiff win rate would always be the same as the 
expected population guilt level.  Since not all disputes litigate to a final judgment, the win 
rate will differ from the population average guilt level.  But will it move closer to fifty 
percent? 
 
                                                 
15 Waldfogel, 1995, at 232, notes that his model assumes that the “distribution of filed cases’ underlying 
quality is standard normal,” which means that guilt is assumed to normally distributed in his study.  Given 
Proposition 3, the fifty percent should be observed in any model that assumes a normal or symmetric 
distribution of case quality.   16
Proposition 4: The plaintiff win rate will be closer to fifty percent than is the 
expected population level of guilt, that is,  
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22
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Let A =  , which is the numerator of
1
0
()() vf v h v dv ∫ ˆ μ .  Integrating by parts 
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After applying integration by parts again 
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or, equivalently, 
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11
00
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Since  , we have 
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One case in which the inequality( )( ) ˆˆ (1 ) 0 μμμ μ − −− <holds is when ˆ μ μ >  and 
.  From (9),  ( ˆ (1 ) 0 μμ −− < ) ˆ μ μ >  will hold when 
11
00
() () 0 vGh v dv vGh v dv μ −> ∫∫ ,  
or equivalently when μ μ > % .  The other inequality follows from (8) and setting (10) less 
than zero. ■ 
 
Given the relationship amongμ ,μ % , and ˆ μ implied by (8), there is an equivalent 
set of conditions governing the relationship between μ  and  ˆ μ . For example, the 




θ <+ −μ %  imply ˆ μ μ < and ˆ 1 μ θμ < − .  Without imposing 
additional conditions not imposed in Proposition 4, there is no reason to believe that these 
parameter constraints are likely to be satisfied in general. 
The question remains whether the first implication of the Priest-Klein conjecture 
(Proposition 4) is likely to hold for a diverse set of guilt distributions.  To examine this, 
we take a more formal approach below.  Specifically, we examine the conditions that 
must be imposed on the distribution of guilt to satisfy the first and second implications of 
the Priest-Klein conjecture, given the symmetry property of the conditional probability of 
litigation function. 
 
D. Implications of Priest-Klein Conjecture 
 
Taking advantage of the symmetry of f, we will examine the properties that the 
population distribution of guilt must have in order for the first and second implications of   18
the Priest-Klein conjecture to hold.  Recall that the first implication is that the plaintiff 
win rate is closer to fifty percent than is the population guilt level.  We derive a condition 
under which this holds. 
 
Theorem 1: Let v be a random variable with the density function h(v): [0,1] → 
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Before we begin the proof, we first see two definitions and one lemma. 
 
Definition 1: A function α χ :[0  is called the characteristic function of 
the interval 












] α α − + and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Definition 2: A function  f is called a symmetric simple function if there exist a 




n α ∈ (1 , 2 , 3 , nN ) = K where  0 0 α = and 
1
2
N α = and a finite non-increasing sequence of nonnegative numbers Mn (n = 0,1, 2,…, 
N) such that  n f M = on the interval  1] n α
11
22
n α [,− −−and  1
11
[, ] nn 22
α α − ++ for 
.  1, 2,3, = K, nN
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Remark: based on the two definitions above, it is not hard to see any symmetric 
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1 12 () 2 f MM M α χ =− + . 
Lemma 1. For any function which is increasing on the 
interval







, there exists a sequence { } n f of symmetric simple 
functions such that lim ( ) ( n n ) f v f v
→∞ = almost everywhere on[0 where  ,1] 1 () () nn f vfv + ≤ for 
  1, 2,3, n = K
We omit the proof of Lemma1 here since it simply follows the idea that any real 
function can be almost everywhere pointwisely approximated by the simple functions and 
the proof of that can be found in every real analysis book. 
 





















Taking  f α χ = in (11) simply gives us the necessity. 
As to the sufficiency, (12) gives us that (11) holds for the characteristic functions  α χ  and 
by the linearity, (11) also holds for any characteristic function multiplied by a constant. 
Then since any symmetric simple function is a linear combination of characteristic 
functions, it is natural for us to expect (11) holds for any symmetric simple function f . 
Indeed, without lost of generality, to prove that we may assume 2 N = . The proofs of 
other cases follow completely the same idea. 
Now,
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Therefore, (11) holds for any symmetric simple function.  
  Our final step is to use Lemma1 to extend the result of symmetric simple 





and symmetric around 
1
2
, by Lemma1, there exists a sequence 
{} n f of symmetric simple functions where  ( n ) f v increases to  () f v almost everywhere. 
   21
Then by the Lebesgue Dominance Convergence Theorem, we have 
 and 
11
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11
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which completes the proof.■ 
 
Theorem 1 means that a necessary and sufficient condition for the first 
implication of the Priest-Klein conjecture – that the win rate is closer to fifty percent than 
is the population level of guilt – is that the distribution of guilt have the following 
property: within any window around the fifty percent guilt level, the conditional mean 
given you are within the window is at least as close to fifty percent as is the mean of the 
distribution.   
Theorem 1 is intuitive in view of the effect of the settlement-censoring process 
under symmetric information.  The effect of settlement censoring is to exclude or under-
weight cases in which the guilt level is close to one or close to zero.  If the population 
distribution of guilt is such that the mean is at least as close to fifty percent within any 
window around ½ than for the whole distribution, then the censoring that takes place 
under symmetric information will always move the win rate closer to fifty percent than is 
the population guilt level.  Thus, the first implication of Priest-Klein conjecture holds 
when (and only when) the population distribution of guilt satisfies the window property 
in (12). 
The window property is satisfied by a diverse set of distributions.  Certainly any 
symmetric distribution will satisfy the window property.  Moreover, a large set of   22
asymmetric distributions also satisfy it.  We tried several simulations with the Beta 
distribution and could not find a parameter set that failed to satisfy the window property. 
The following example illustrates a case in which Theorem 1 does not hold.  The 
distribution of guilt in this example does not satisfy the window property. 
 
Example: Let h(v) = v + 15(2
13)(v – ½)
14 describe the population distribution of 
guilt, and let the function f(v) = – (v – ½ )
2 + .25 approximate the conditional probability 
of litigation given the guilt level.  In the model, the conditional probability of litigation 
function is determined by the underlying truncated normal.  We have chosen a simple 
function that is symmetric about ½ to aid the illustration.  The population distribution of 








                      Figure 1: A hypothetical guilt distribution      
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so the win rate conditional on litigation is further away from fifty percent than is the 
population average level of guilt. 
   23
Recall that the second implication of the Priest-Klein conjecture is that as the 
censoring process becomes more severe, in the sense that the conditional probability of 
litigation function f becomes more convex, the plaintiff win rate will tend more reliably 
toward fifty percent.  While Proposition 2 is a statement about the first order stochastic 
dominance, the second implication is really a statement about second order stochastic 
dominance.  In other words, as the conditional litigation function becomes more 
dominant in the second order sense, the tendency of the plaintiff win rate to fifty percent 
becomes more certain or reliable. 
 
Theorem 2: Let  be a random variable with the density function 
. The function is increasing on the 
interval
v
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when ε  is small enough. 
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Proof: First notice that the boundedness of f(v) guarantees the finiteness of the 
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Now we construct an instrument function which extends the domain to .  
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which completes the proof.■  
 
 
  The intuition for Theorem 2 is straightforward.  As the conditional probability of 
litigation function becomes more convex, it will approach the shape of a spike at the fifty 
percent guilt level.  The rest of the argument can be drawn on the reasoning for the 
familiar Chebyshev inequality.  However, intuition based on the Chebyshev inequality is 
not technically appropriate in this case.  The Chebyshev inequality addresses a 
relationship between a realization of a random variable and its mean, as the variance of 
the underlying distribution collapses.  In contrast, this is a model of a censoring process 
applied to a random variable (the guilt level).  The “distribution” that “collapses” in this 
case is the conditional probability function describing the censoring process.  Rather than 
a case where the variance of a specific probability distribution collapses as in the 
Chebyshev result, this is instead a case where the censoring process becomes more 
convex around a particular conditioning value. 
  The second theorem provides an alternative way of looking at the argument that 
the fifty percent prediction of Priest and Klein holds in the limit as the trial rate goes to   26
zero (Waldfogel, 1995).  The “in the limit” result can be viewed as a statement about the 
convexity of the censoring function f.  That convexity, in turn, is determined by the 
convexity of the prediction error variance σ(v).  Thus, if we use σ"(v)/σ(v) as a measure 
of the convexity of the error variance, the limiting result depends on  σ"(v)/σ(v) 
increasing.  As the convexity of σ(v) increases, the win rate approaches fifty percent. 
  In terms of implications for litigation, the second theorem implies that the fifty 
percent result holds as relative uncertainty lessens at the extremes of the guilt probability 
scale, relative to the center.  Greater convexity translates into cases settling with greater 
frequency when the guilt status of the defendant is close to one or close to zero.  This is 
more likely to be true when the law is clear, which makes it easier to determine whether a 
violation occurred, or the facts of the dispute are clear.   
The following simple numerical example illustrates the effects of greater 
convexity in the censoring function.   
Example: Consider two censoring processes, with the second being more convex 
than the first.  Assume the connection between the guilt of the defendant, the distribution 
of guilt, and the probability of litigation given guilt is as follows: 
 
v          ¼             ½              ¾  
Prob(lit | v)         .2           .6         .2 
Prob(v = vo)        .3             .3             .4 
 
Under these assumptions, 
 
E(v) = (¼) (.3) + (¾)(.4) + (½)(.3) = .52 
Prob(lit) = (.3)(.2)+ (.4)(.2) + (.3)(.6) = .32 
1 (.2)(.3) 1 (.3)(.6) 3 (.2)(.4)
( | ) .515
4 .32 2 .32 4 .32
Evl i t ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ =++ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
=
   
Now consider an alternative censoring process that is more convex in the sense described 
earlier. 
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v          ¼             ½              ¾  
Prob(lit | v)         .1           .7         .1 
Prob(v = vo)        .3             .3             .4 
 
For this case, we have 
 
E(v) = (¼) (.3) + (¾)(.4) + (½)(.3) = .52 
Prob(lit) = (.3)(.1)+ (.4)(.1) + (.3)(.7) = .28 
1 (.1)(.3) 1 (.7)(.3) 3 (.1)(.4)
( | ) .509
4 .28 2 .28 4 .28
Evl i t ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ =++ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
=
                                                
 
 
  The trial rate could also approach zero as the cost of litigation increases relative to 
the judgment (γ increases) (Waldfogel, 1995).  This is equivalent to shifting the censoring 
function f down, which will generally result in the disputes at the extreme of the guilt 
distribution settling.  However, Theorem 1 and the counterexample imply that this effect 
will not necessarily lead to a movement toward fifty percent.  If the window property is 
not satisfied by the guilt distribution, a shift downward of the censoring function may not 
result in a win rate closer to fifty percent.
16 
 
E. Generalization of Conjecture 
 
Much of the foregoing has been an effort to understand the conditions under 
which the Priest-Klein conjecture may be valid.  The core assumption is that the variance 
of the difference between the parties’ trial outcome prediction errors is a function of the 
level of guilt (heteroscedasticity) and that this function is symmetric about the midpoint 
of the range of guilt levels.  The prediction errors can be viewed as random shocks that 
cause the litigant’s subjective prediction of the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff to 
differ from the rational estimate based on the litigant’s information set.  Since parties are 
 
16 Of course, if the underlying distribution of guilt is symmetric (which would satisfy the window property 
of Theorem 1), then shifting the censoring function down will lead to the fifty percent result.  Waldfogel 
(1995, at 232) assumes the distribution of guilt is normal, which may explain his finding.  We impose no 
functional assumptions on the distribution of guilt.   28
assumed to have symmetric information, the rational prediction of the guilt level is the 
same for both parties and is equal to the true guilt level.  When the litigant’s information 
generates a rational prediction equal to the most uncertain guilt level, fifty percent, his 
subjective prediction is most sensitive to a random shock.   
  Of course, the variance symmetry property need not hold.  It could be that the 
variance of the prediction error difference is greater when guilt levels are small than 
when they are large (or the converse).  Consider, for example, the simple case of failing 
to look both ways before crossing an intersection in a car.  A failure to look is obviously 
negligence, and the prediction of guilt would be relatively insensitive to information-
processing errors.  On the other hand, looking both ways may have been held reasonable 
care in a previous case, but may not necessarily be so in any other case with more 
complicated facts.  The actual prediction would be relatively more sensitive to prediction 
error than in the clear non-compliance scenario (failing to look). 
  The possibility that the prediction error variance might be asymmetric suggests a 
generalization on the Priest-Klein conjecture.  If the assumption of symmetric 
heterscedasticity is replaced with an assumption of asymmetric heteroscedasticity, then 
there should be no clear tendency for the plaintiff win rate to move toward fifty percent, 
even under the window property of Theorem 1.  Indeed, if the direction of the asymmetry 
(or skewness) is right (left), the model presented here would suggest a win rate that is 
greater than (less than) fifty percent.  The easiest way to see this generalization of the 
Priest-Klein conjecture is to consider the case where the distribution of guilt is 
symmetric. 
 
Proposition 5:  Suppose the prediction error difference is asymmetrically 
hesteroscedastic, with a left skew.  Then the plaintiff win rate will be less than fifty 
percent for any symmetric guilt distribution.  Conversely, if the prediction error 
difference has a right skew, the plaintiff win rate will be greater than fifty percent for any 
symmetric guilt distribution. 
 
Proof: Assume the following form of asymmetric heteroskedasticity: 
(1)  () ( 1 ) vv σ σ ≥− and () 0 v σ′ > for 0 < v < ½ .   29
(2) ( ) (1 ) vv σ σ ≤− and ( ) 0 v σ′ < for ½ < v < 1. 
This implies 
() ( 1 ) f vf v ≥− for 0 < v < ½ , and 
() ( 1 ) f vf v ≥− for ½ < v < 1 , 
which means that the conditional probability of litigation function, graphed over v, is 
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The second equality follows from the symmetry of h(v).  The inequality results from the 






v fvhvd v fvhvd v ≤ ∫∫  
so that  
1 ˆ
2
μ ≤ . 
If we reverse the inequalities in (1) and (2), the same argument leads to the conclusion 
that ˆ μ ≥ ½. ■  
 
Proposition 5 illuminates some limitations on the Priest-Klein conjecture.  Recall 
that we described the conjecture as having two key implications: first, that the plaintiff 
win rate would be closer to fifty percent than is the population guilt level, and, second, 
that as the censoring function became more convex, the tendency of the win rate to equal 
fifty percent would become more reliable.  It should be clear that in the presence of 
asymmetric heteroscedasticity, the first implication is not valid.  Theorem 1 shows that 
for any population distribution of guilt that satisfies what we have called the window 
property, the win rate will be closer to fifty percent than is the expected population guilt 
level.  That result is inconsistent with Proposition 5.  The symmetric distribution of guilt   30
obviously satisfies the window property of Theorem 1.  That the settlement process leads 
to a win rate different from fifty percent shows that the first implication of the Priest-
Klein conjecture is not valid when the symmetric heteroscedasticity assumption is 
replaced by asymmetric heteroscedasticity. 
  The second implication of the Priest-Klein conjecture no longer continues to hold, 
though the deviation from fifty percent is vanishing in the limit.  As the censoring process 
becomes more severe (convex), the expected win rate conditional on litigation will 
necessarily move toward fifty percent.  However, the plaintiff win rate will be biased in 
the direction in which the prediction error variance is skewed. 
 
F. Extension to Judicial Error Setting and Asymmetric Information 
 
To simplify the analysis we assumed in the previous part that courts operate 
without error.  Under that assumption, the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff is the 
same as the probability that the defendant is guilty.  If courts make mistakes, the 
probability of a verdict for the plaintiff will differ from the probability of guilt.  Error 
distorts the link between case quality and merit. 
  When courts make mistakes, the foregoing analysis remains intact, though the 
notation is more complicated.  The distribution of the probability of a verdict in favor of 
the plaintiff will now differ from the population guilt distribution.  But since the two are 
linearly related, the two distributions will also be related.  If the density for the 















over the interval q2 and 1–q1–q2.  None of the results in the previous part is dependent on 
the assumption that v runs from 0 to 1, and they can be modified where necessary to 
incorporate the new limits. 
  For the asymmetric information setting examined next, there are substantial 
differences between the model with judicial error and the model without error.  The most   31
basic implications are the same between these two models, but the details are so different 
that it would be difficult to analyze the model with error by reinterpreting the model 
without error.  Because the error-free model is a special case of the judicial error model, 
we will examine the model with error in the remaining parts. 
As a general matter, P
'
p = wp(1–q1p) + (1–wp)q2p, where wp = E(w| Ωp), q1p = E(q1| 
Ωp), q2p = E(q2| Ωp); and, similarly, P
'
d = wd(1–q1d) + (1–wd)q2d.   For each litigant, the 
rational prediction of the probability of guilt and the prediction of the likelihood of error 
will both depend on the information available to him.  In the case of the uninformed 
litigant, his rational predictions are equal to the objective probability based on public 
information.  For the informed litigant, his estimate of w is equal to 1 in the case of non-
compliance by the defendant, or 0 in the case of compliance by the defendant. 
  Thus, in a dispute involving an informed-innocent defendant and an uninformed 
plaintiff, P
'
p = v and P
'
d = q2, and the actual predictions are:  
 
Pp = v + εp               (15) 
   
Pd = q2 + εd               (16) 
 
As in the previous part, we will assume litigation is determined by condition (1) 
from the LPG model.  However, the LPG condition requires additional justification in a 
model that allows for asymmetric information.  In asymmetric information models the 
settlement decision is not governed solely by the LPG condition.  Indeed, litigation 
occurs more frequently under Bebchuk’s screening model than would be implied by the 
LPG model.  The reason is that the uninformed plaintiff trades off the cost of litigating 
for the gain of getting a larger share of the settlement surplus. 
In spite of this, there are two justifications for using the LPG model to describe 
litigation here.  The first is Occam’s razor.  This model assumes that error in litigants’ 
predictions of the probability of plaintiff victory plays a substantial role in generating 
litigation.  In the absence of such error, settlement decisions would separate the guilty 
from the innocent, unless the parties behaved strategically (Bebchuk, 1984).  With error   32
in predictions, the defendant’s willingness to settle does not reveal his type.  Strategic 
behavior is therefore not a necessary feature of the litigation model. 
Second, the LPG condition is broadly consistent with both screening and 
signaling models of litigation.  In signaling models LPG condition (1) still separates the 
conditions in which litigation may occur from those in which it will not (Png, 1983; Png 
1987, Hylton 2002).  In other words, the LPG condition provides a lower bound on the 
settlement zone.  In Bebchuk’s screening model, the LPG condition is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for settlement – that is, it provides an upper bound on the settlement 
zone.
17  The LPG model permits us to capture in broad form the implications of both 
types of asymmetric information model without having to commit to one of them. 
We consider two asymmetric information scenarios: where the defendant has the 
informational advantage and where the plaintiff has the informational advantage.  When 
the defendant has the informational advantage, the frequency of litigation will depend on 
the defendant’s type.  If the plaintiff is uninformed and the defendant is innocent, P
'
p = 
w(1–q1) + (1–w)q2, P
'
d = q2; thus, ΔI = w(1–q1–q2).   
In the asymmetric information setting w should be understood as the rational 
prediction of the probability of guilt given information publicly available about the 
parties and the facts of the dispute.  In the previous section of this paper, where we 
considered symmetric information, the plaintiff and the defendant chose the same 
estimate for w.  In this part, only the uninformed party chooses w as his estimate of the 
probability of guilt.  Having chosen w, the uninformed party’s estimate of the likelihood 
of a verdict for the plaintiff is equal to v = w(1–q1)+(1–w)q2. 
Let  fI be the probability of litigation for the innocent-defendant, uninformed 
plaintiff pairing, given guilt level w.  The frequency of litigation is  
 
fI = 1 – GI               (17) 
 
where the probability of settlement, is  
                                                 
17 One way to think of the difference between the models is by drawing an analogy to price setting.  In 
Bebchuk’s model the uninformed litigant screens by setting the settlement amount.  He sets the price in 
order to grab some of the surplus, which results in the standard monopoly-pricing inefficiency.  In the 
signaling model the informed actors set prices in a way that price discriminates.   33
 





















.       (18) 
 
It should be clear that litigation can occur even though the defendant’s guilt level is low.  
The plaintiff is uninformed, so makes his decision on whether to litigate on the 
population average level of guilt. 
  If the defendant is guilty, P
'
p = w(1–q1) + (1–w)q2, P
'
d = 1–q1, and ΔG = – (1–
w)(1–q1–q2).  Let fG be the probability of litigation for the guilty-defendant, uninformed 
plaintiff pairing, given guilt level w. 
 
fG = 1 – GG               (19) 
 
where the probability of settlement, is  
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Proposition 6: For any Δ1 > Δ2,  
 
          11 1 22 (; 1 , 1 ) (; 1 , 1 GG 2 ) γ γ −Δ − −Δ −Δ < −Δ − −Δ −Δ   . 
 
Proof: This is to show that  ( ; 1 ,1 ) G γ −Δ − −Δ −Δ is decreasing in  , or increasing 
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For any value of  , the curve of  with regard to  t y xis strictly concave. On the curve, we 
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It follows that fI > fG, since it is a special case where ΔI = w(1–q1–q2) and ΔG = –
(1–w)(1–q1–q2).  Since ΔI > ΔG, we have GI(γ – ΔI ; –1– ΔI , 1– ΔI) < GG(γ – ΔG ; –1– ΔG , 
1– ΔG); and it follows that fI > fG.  The reason fI > fG is that guilty informed defendants 
settle their cases at a higher rate than do the innocent informed defendants.  Since guilty 
defendants are more likely to be held liable than are the innocent, the potential payoff 
from litigating is lower for the guilty. 
  As in the previous parts we will examine the plaintiff win rate.  When the 
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                  (21) 
 
Following the approach of the previous part, we can derive the key implications for trial 
selection by examining the setting in which the guilt distribution is symmetric.  If the 
fifty percent prediction fails to hold in the symmetric guilt distribution case, then it will 
clearly not hold in the more general analysis. 
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Proposition 7: Assume the guilt distribution is symmetric.  When the defendant 
(plaintiff) has the informational advantage, the plaintiff win rate will be less than 
(greater than) or equal to fifty percent, as long as error rates satisfy reasonable 
assumptions.  
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The symmetry of fI and fG are established by the first step of the proof of Proposition 2.  
Assuming the symmetry of the guilt distribution and taking advantage of Proposition 3, 
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Rewrite (22) as 
 
12
11 ˆ ˆ (1 )
22




Where θ %  is equal to the left hand side of (23) and  ˆ θ  is equal to the left hand side of (24).  
Moreover, it is straightforward to show that ˆ θ θ < % , 1 θ < % , , and .  The 
question is whether
ˆ 1 θ > ˆ 2 θθ += %
1 ˆ
2
μ ≤ .  To simplify the remaining argument, assume the judicial 
error terms q1 and q2 are close in value, so that q2 = q1+ε.  Then2 ˆ 1 μ ≤ if and only if (1–
q1)θ % ≤1–(q1+ε) ˆ θ .  Since , this is equivalent to0( ˆ 2 θθ += %
1 12 q ) ( 1 ) ( 2 ) θ εθ ≤ −− − %% − .  For 
ε sufficiently close to zero and q1<½, this holds with a strict inequality.  Indeed, for 
reasonable assumptions on the judicial error terms, the condition holds.  It is violated 
when q2>q1 (ε large) and q1 is close to ½, which are conditions under which judicial 
decisions are essentially coin tosses. ■ 
 
  It follows that even if the window property of Theorem 1 holds, the plaintiff win 
rate will not tend toward fifty percent.  However, there are directional tendencies.  Where 
the defendant has the informational advantage, the win rate will tend toward a level that 
is less than or equal to fifty percent, and conversely where the plaintiff has the 
informational advantage. 
 
G. Asymmetric Stakes 
 
We have to this point ignored the issue of asymmetric stakes, which was a part of 
the original Priest-Klein analysis.  The asymmetric stakes theory was offered by Priest 
and Klein as an explanation for areas of litigation, such as medical malpractice, in which 
plaintiff win rates were consistently below the fifty percent prediction of their model.  
The model presented in the previous parts generates plaintiff win rates that deviate from 
fifty percent without the additional assumption of asymmetric stakes.  However, the   37
model can be extended to incorporate asymmetric stakes.
18  In the remainder of this paper 
we will discuss the application of this model to trial win rate data. 
  
III. Discussion and Implications 
 
We have identified three main settings in which to examine the tendency of 
plaintiff win rates toward fifty percent, as hypothesized by Priest and Klein.  The first is 
where the censoring function (probability of litigation conditional on the guilt level) is 
symmetric over the range of guilt levels with a maximum at fifty percent.  The second is 
where the censoring function has a maximum at fifty percent but is asymmetrical.  The 
third is where the litigants have asymmetric information.  There is a straightforward 
generalization of the Priest-Klein hypothesis: (1) under symmetric information and 
uncertainty, the plaintiff win rate tends toward fifty percent; (2) under symmetric 
information and asymmetric uncertainty, the win rate tends toward the pole with greatest 
uncertainty; and (3) under asymmetric information and symmetric uncertainty, the win 
rate favors the party with the information advantage 
  The symmetric censoring function corresponds to the original Priest-Klein 
analysis.  This is a setting that can be described, to use Holmes’s language, as one of 
penumbral uncertainty.  The uncertainty around the trial verdict is greatest when the 
defendant’s compliance is in a region of uncertainty between clear non-compliance and 
clear compliance.  Uncertainty at the edges is minimal.  Consider a medical malpractice 
case.  Under the law of torts, a doctor’s negligence is determined by his compliance with 
custom of the medical profession.  If the doctor complies with the custom he is not 
negligent, and conversely.  Uncertainty is minimal at the endpoints of compliance and 
noncompliance.  Litigation is most likely to arise when the fact of compliance is unclear.  
If both doctor and patient have symmetric information with respect to the facts, the 
conditions of the Priest-Klein analysis will hold.  Symmetric information might be 
observed when the doctor is charged with negligence in a course of conduct that is 
observable by the patient – for example, the diagnosis of a physical ailment. 
                                                 
18 Let the plaintiff’s payoff from litigation be the sum of the damage award J and the “stakes gain” G.  The 
defendant loses J and the “stakes loss” L.  The condition for litigation then becomes (Pp–Pd)(J+L) + Pp(G–
L) > C, which can then be treated in a manner similar to (1).   38
  The second case identified by the model of this paper is one of symmetric 
information where the level of uncertainty is greatest midway between the endpoints of 
compliance and noncompliance, but uncertainty is greater at one endpoint than at the 
other.  To use Holmes’s terms, this is the setting of asymmetric (or one-sided) umbral 
uncertainty.  This case was not identified in the Priest-Klein analysis, and has not been 
examined in previous analyses of trial selection.  Consider the road crossing example.  
Failing to look both ways is negligence.  On the other hand, looking both ways may have 
been deemed reasonable care in a previous case, but may not be under more complicated 
facts.  In other words, while there is a set of acts that will always be deemed a failure to 
comply, it may be impossible to identify a set of acts that will always be deemed 
compliance.  The umbral uncertainty associated with compliance may be greater than that 
associated with noncompliance.  The win rate will tend toward the node with greatest 
umbral uncertainty.  Thus, if the uncertainty surrounding the court’s decision in the case 
of compliance is greater than in the case of noncompliance, the win rate will tend toward 
a level less than fifty percent. 
  As an alternative example consider malpractice.  Many courts have replaced local 
standards of medical custom with national standards.  In a setting where the litigants 
expect that the local standard to be replaced by a national standard, there would be one-
sided umbral uncertainty, with the uncertainty associated with compliance greater than 
that associated with noncompliance.  The uncertainty would be legal rather than factual, 
but the difference is not important in this example.  Legal uncertainty simply means that 
the given facts of the case might generate a different legal outcome than expected under a 
particular view of the law.  This is no different from saying that given a clear rule, factual 
uncertainty implies that the clear legal rule might generate a different outcome than 
expected under a particular view of the facts.   
  The third set of cases identified by this model is informational asymmetry, a topic 
that the literature has explored.  Medical malpractice offers many scenarios of 
informational asymmetry.  If the patient is put under anesthesia, he will not know what 
procedures were performed on him, while the doctor will know.  Any negligence claim 
brought against the doctor will involve a patient who is ignorant of the facts bearing on 
the doctor’s compliance with medical custom during the period he was anesthetized.     39
Doctors who know they violated the custom will tend to settle, while doctors who know 
that they did not will litigate to judgment.  The result will be a tendency of the plaintiff 
win rate below fifty percent. 
  This model does not incorporate the asymmetric stakes argument of Priest and 
Klein, though it is not difficult to extend the model to do so.  For Priest and Klein, 
asymmetric stakes provided an argument that explained plaintiff win rates that 
consistently deviated from fifty percent.  However, we do not have a need to employ the 
asymmetric stakes argument, given that plaintiff win rates that deviate from fifty percent 
are generated on the basis of the uncertainty captured within this model. 
  There are difficult questions associated with the empirical application of this 
model.  Any attempt to empirically test this model would have to distinguish cases of 
penumbral uncertainty from asymmetric umbral uncertainty, and in addition distinguish 
cases of informational asymmetry.  Since penumbral uncertainty is a characteristic of all 
litigated disputes, the analyst would have to try to identify the cases where the effects of 
umbral uncertainty or informational asymmetry are likely to outweigh those of 
penumbral uncertainty.  Similarly, any attempt to use the model to provide a positive 
theory of trial outcome statistics must distinguish the various types of uncertainty that 
generate plaintiff win rate patterns that diverge from the fifty percent prediction. 
  Table 1 provides a summary of the salient results from empirical studies of trial 
selection.  The studies summarized in the table are those of Priest and Klein (1984), 
Eisenberg (1990), Kessler, Meites, and Miller (1996), and Waldfogel (1995).  Priest and 
Klein is the only article in the table that uses a sample based on state court trials.  The 
remaining three studies use samples from federal court.  The distinction could be 
important in examining the evidence of trial selection.  To bring a lawsuit in federal 
court, the plaintiff’s case must raise a federal question (e.g., an issue under a federal 
statute) or there must be “diversity of citizenship” between the plaintiff and defendant, 
meaning that the parties are not from the same state.  For the ordinary personal injury 
torts shown in the first two rows of Table 1, a large number of the lawsuits must be based 
on diversity, which means that the amount in controversy had to cross a minimum 
financial threshold. The diversity requirements impart some degree of selection 
immediately in the federal sample.   40
  In any event, if there are selection biases embedded in the federal sample, they are 
not obvious to the naked eye.  The most obvious impression is that the fifty percent 
hypothesis of Priest and Klein does not hold generally.  This paper’s model implies that 
the fifty percent win rate prediction will hold under rather special conditions: no (one-
sided) informational asymmetry, no asymmetric umbral uncertainty, and the underlying 
guilt distribution satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1.   41
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      Summary of Plaintiff Win Rates in Four Studies 
 





























































































































     
    Notes: *Based on common carrier, injury on property, street hazard, and dramshop 
    categories in Table 7 of Priest and Klein (1984).   42
  The results that seem closest to the fifty percent prediction are the first two cells 
from the Priest-Klein study, showing plaintiff win rates for “non-traffic torts” and for 
“traffic torts”,
19 and the first cell from the Eisenberg study, showing the win rate from 
“non-traffic torts”.  However, even within their respective rows, the win rates from the 
other studies diverge widely from the fifty percent prediction, though most of them are 
below fifty percent.  Waldfogel (1995) finds evidence that the fifty percent hypothesis 
holds in samples in which the trial rate is relatively low.  If the data in the first two rows 
were disaggregated by court or by year, the fifty percent result might be observed in 
specific courts or years in which trials were less frequent.  In addition, the first row 
(personal injury torts, non-traffic) aggregates different areas of litigation (premises 
liability, worker injury, etc.), some of which may fail to satisfy the requirements of the 
fifty percent prediction. 
  The more consistent patterns appear in the third through sixth rows.  The product 
liability, medical malpractice, employment discrimination, and antitrust categories show 
a consistent pattern of plaintiff win rates less than fifty percent.  
  The model in this paper incorporates two uncertainty based explanations for the 
win rates below fifty percent.  One is defendant-sided informational asymmetry: if the 
defendant has an informational advantage over the plaintiff, then the plaintiff win rate 
will tend to be less than fifty percent.  The other explanation is compliance-centered 
umbral uncertainty: if there is greater uncertainty associated with compliance than with 
noncompliance, win rates will tend toward the level associated with the compliance 
endpoint.  
  The consistent low win rates for medical malpractice litigation invite an 
explanation based on informational asymmetry.  Informational asymmetry with respect to 
facts is a recognized feature of medical malpractice litigation. 
                                                 
19 The personal injury torts (non-traffic) cell from Priest and Klein (the first cell in Table 1) excludes 
traffic-based torts,  medical malpractice, product liability, and worker injury torts.  Priest and Klein treated 
the last three categories as anomalous because of asymmetric stakes.  We think informational asymmetry is 
largely responsible for the results reported by Priest and Klein in these categories.  Priest and Klein 
reported high win rate for worker injury cases.  They could not explain the result.  The most  plausible 
explanation is that the worker injury lawsuits, which are brought by workers against non-employers (e.g., 
property owners), reflect selection based on asymmetric information.  Most weak worker lawsuits will be 
selected into workers compensation.  Workers who have relatively strong claims (say, because of an 
absence of any contributory negligence) will select into the tort system by suing non-employers.   43
  The low product liability win rates could also be explained by the asymmetric 
information theory.  Liability for defective design is determined by the risk-utility test, 
which compares the incremental risk and the incremental utility of the challenged design 
relative to some feasible safer alternative.  The test may give an informational advantage 
to the defendant, provided the defendant knows more than the plaintiff about the 
incremental risk and the range of feasible alternatives, which seems plausible.  But this is 
unlikely to be a complete explanation for the low win rates.  The risk and utility features 
of many products are easily observable or at least discoverable early in a trial.
20 In 
addition, some courts have shifted the burden of proof on the risk-utility where evidence 
is entirely in the hands of the defendant.
21   Given this, compliance-centered umbral 
uncertainty provides an alternative explanation for the low win rates in product liability 
litigation.  In cases where the product cannot be made entirely free of risk, there is no 
absolutely safe feasible alternative; the manufacturer has to trade off some risks for 
others.  In these cases, there is likely to be a great deal of uncertainty over the extent of 
compliance.  A firm that concludes, after a review of the risk tradeoffs, that its product is 
relatively safe will still face substantial uncertainty over whether a court would find that 
the design was defective. 
  Employment discrimination and antitrust share the same features as product 
liability.  There is a plausible argument in both areas that the defendant has an 
informational advantage, more so in the discrimination case than in the antitrust case.  
The defendant in an employment discrimination action knows more about the efficiency 
justifications for its decisions than will the plaintiff.  But employment discrimination is 
an area where compliance-centered umbral uncertainty is likely to exist.  An employer 
can design a test for screening potential employees with the purpose of avoiding a 
discriminatory impact, and still be unsure that it would not lose in a discrimination 
lawsuit later brought on the basis of the test outcome. 
  We have not attempted to conduct an empirical test of the selection pressures 
identified in this article.  However, such a test should start with identifying areas in which 
informational asymmetry or one-sided umbral uncertainty are likely to dominate the 
                                                 
20 Of course, the discovery process may not fully reveal the private information of the defendant, see Hay 
(1995).  Discovery may be insufficient to change the dispute into a symmetric information case. 
21 See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).   44
penumbral uncertainty emphasized by Priest and Klein.  This requires an examination of 
the relevant legal tests that will determine the outcome of litigation.  The simplest types 
of litigation to examine will be those in which the legal test examines the conduct of only 
one party.  For example, in medical malpractice cases, the legal test focuses on the doctor 
alone; contributory negligence is almost never an issue.  Within the set of tests that focus 
on the conduct of one actor, the relative influence of informational asymmetry and 




We have offered a model that unifies existing trial selection theories and 
introduces a new theory as well.  The model identifies conditions under which the fifty 
percent prediction holds, and also suggests that the conditions under which it holds are 
unlikely to be observed generally. The symmetric information version of our model, 
which incorporates the Priest-Klein analysis, generates the fifty percent prediction of the 
Priest-Klein analysis.  However, it also predicts win rates that deviate from fifty percent 
when litigation uncertainty is greater at one end of the guilty spectrum than at the other.  
The general prevalence of below fifty percent win rate statistics in litigation may be 
explained by the simple fact that trial outcome uncertainty surrounding compliance is 
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